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Abstract 
Part 1 established the theoretical framework for undertaking a top-down/bottom-up mash-up between the Axiomatic 
Design/Complexity Theory (AD/CT) and the Design Patterns (ÐP) framework. It synthesized an integrated N-model from the top-
down V-Model and its antipodal/bottom-up Λ-model. Part 2 illustrates the approach in the domain of Cybersecurity. Recent trends 
in Cybersecurity indicates that our modern socio-technical systems are increasingly vulnerable to both external as well as internal 
threats. As the cost of defending our cyberstructures as well as the payoffs from successful attacks keeps rising, the cost of 
launching an attack simultaneously keeps decreasing. Cyber warfare is fundamentally asymmetric. Designing and managing 
modern socio-technical systems will demand greater appreciation for the language of threat-patterns and its defence. This paper 
applies the N-model to arrive at a generic pattern-language compositional technique using the Axiomatic Design Matrix. It then 
shows how one may splice the FR↔DP mappings with the FR↔ÐP mappings. Transcending the technical and into the socio, it is 
increasingly clear that wars of the future will be fought in the crucible of each individual human mind. Cognitive Biases are the 
patterns of weaknesses in this domain. The paper illustrates that patterns of cognitive biases can lead to patterns of cyber insecurity.    
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of 9th International Conference on Axiomatic Design. 
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1. Introduction  
     Part 1 covered the theoretical underpinnings of the 
Axiomatic-Design/Design-Patterns (AD/CT-ÐP) mash-up 
along the N-model. The approach is formalized as a 4 stage 
process as shown below:  
x 1st Leg of /\/: Review the ÐP and explicate the embedded 
conceptual hierarchy.  
x 2nd Leg of /\/: Top-Down decomposition & Axiomatic 
framing of the ÐP; disambiguation of the FR↔DP 
mappings. 
x 3rd Leg of /\/: Bottom-Up integrations, including those at 
the sub-system/system levels.  
x Cross-Domain Integrations:  This is where the AD/CT-ÐP 
mash-up may show unexpected positive results. 
Part 2 illustrates the approach using Cybersecurity Patterns. 
Section §2 reviews some of the recent high profile 
cyberattacks. Sections §3 to §6 cover the above N model.  
Section §4 puts forth a generic pattern-language compositional 
technique using the Axiomatic Design Matrix. Section §7 
transcends the technical and into the social to make the case 
that cyber security patterns of attack ultimately originate in the 
realm of patterns of cognitive biases. And as information 
agents, we leave cybertraces of these patterns to our detriment. 
Boyd’s OODA framework [15] provides a way to overcome 
these failures both at the individual as well as at the state level. 
2. High-Profile Cyberattacks 
Recent high-profile cyberattacks on public and private 
institutions have highlighted the growing vulnerabilities of our 
socio-technical systems. These include the attack on the U.S 
government (Office of Personnel Management-OPM: sensitive 
information on 21 million individuals stolen/June-2015), 
Primera Blue Cross (11 million individuals/March 2015), 
Anthem (80 million individuals/February 2015), Sony Pictures 
(Corporate Data Breach/November 2014), Home Depot (56 
million individuals/September 2014), JPMorgan Chase (76 
million individuals/July-August 2014), eBay (233 million 
individuals/May 2014), Google (5 million/September 2014), 
Yahoo Mail (273 million individuals/January 2014), Target (40 
million individuals/December 2013), etc. 
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Fig. 1. List of 96 FRs & DPs based on [2] 
Consider the OPM case; here the attackers gained access to 
the 127-pages long SF-86 disclosure form detailing highly 
sensitive security clearance data that an applicant submits. This 
attack remained undetected for a whole year, spanning July-
2014-June 2015. Commenting on the breach, FBI Director 
James Comey said [5]:  
If you have my SF-86, you know every place I’ve lived 
since I was 18, contact people at those addresses, 
neighbors at those addresses, all of my family, every place 
I’ve traveled outside the United States since I was 18. If I 
had substantial contact with any non-United States person, 
it’s on there, along with the contact information of that 
person. Just imagine you were a foreign intelligence 
service and you had that data, how it might be useful to 
you. So it’s a big deal. 
While the cost of defending our cyberstructures as well as 
the payoffs from successful attacks keeps rising, the cost of 
launching an attack simultaneously keeps decreasing [7]. Also 
these are mass-customizable security breaches that have the 
potential to combine social-media, data-mining and precision 
targeting. A Reuters report summarizes the OPM incident as 
follows [6]:“The OPM breach gave hackers access to U.S. 
government job applicants' security clearance forms detailing 
past drug use, love affairs, and foreign contacts that officials 
fear could be used for blackmail or recruiting.”  
3. /\/: CyberSecurity ÐP Catalog (1st-Leg) 
A bottom-up inventory of the prevalent Cyber-Security 
patterns have been attempted by various authors [2, 4 and 8]. 
Bunke et al. in [8] account for 415 security patterns (1997-
2012) through digital-search and other means. And after culling 
for duplicates, 364 were deemed unique. Even so, duplicates 
may have been retained. In contrast, Haﬁz et al. in [2] account 
for a limited set of 96 security patterns (1997-2012) put 
together using meticulous semantic mappings. Furthermore, 
this set is organized around a purpose-based, FR-centric 
framework, namely defending against the STRIDE (Spooﬁng, 
Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of 
Service, and Elevation of Privilege) threat-model.  In contrast, 
Bunke et al. [8] use a DP-centric application-domain approach 
(example: network, embedded systems, distributed systems 
etc.) for classifying the various ÐPs. Following Louis 
Sullivan’s dictum “Form Follows Function” which is part and 
parcel of the AD/CT framework, it is logical to attempt the AD: 
ÐP mash-up using the work by Haﬁz et al. [2].   
System Security issues may be broken into Core, Periphery 
and External Zones. Core-Security deals with securing the 
inner sanctum sanctorum of the system which includes data, 
processes, and the internal hardware. As an example, it includes 
securing against DoS (Denial-Of-Service: wherein the limited 
internal resources get swarmed) attack by continuous 
monitoring and parsimonious resource utilization. Perimeter 
Security deals with the "Quo Vadis?" aspect of the system that 
checks and enforces the authentication and authorization of 
anything that crosses the system boundary. External Security 
deals with securing system assets that are currently in transit 
outside the system boundary. The above triple-zone 
demarcation may sound obsolete in the current context of the 
immense commons that is opening up (such as Cloud 
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Computing, BYOD, IoT etc.) and threatening to erode the very 
concept of a system identity and boundary. It is true that 
boundaries may shift, ownership may entail joint-ownership, 
and the "system" may consist of myriad agents working in 
temporary concert that shifts with time; but at any given point 
in time, the "system" is expected to exhibit a bounded nature 
along the lines shown above. Also given the relative size of the 
External zone, it is expected to dominate as is already evident 
in the number of ÐPs dedicated to this zone. And as the larger 
ecosystem evolves, so likewise should the threat model, which 
in AD-language means studying the evolving FR-realm. 
Fig. 1 lists the 96 ÐPs and their inferred FRs (as they are not 
explicated in [2]). The cells are color coded based on STRIDE 
as well as Core, Periphery & External. Note that the Design 
Pattern (ÐP) is different from a Design Parameter (DP) in the 
sense that the former provides a recurring solution template to 
a recurring problem context; it is assembled bottom-up by 
studying an ensemble of paradigm cases prevalent in the 
industry. In contrast, the Design Parameters (DPs) are defined 
in a top-down sense, are specific to the problem at hand, and 
are not driven by exiting industry-wide norms. So how should 
a bottom-up, FR↔ÐP approach dove-tail with a top-down 
FR↔DP approach? We take this up next in the context of a 
Pattern Language.         
4. /\/: Pattern-Language & Axiomatic Design (2nd-Leg) 
Chris Alexander (founder of the Design Patterns approach) 
was cognizant of the conflict between “design as selection” vs. 
“design as invention” when he asserted that [9]: “Those 
problems of creating form that are traditionally called "design 
problems” all demand invention.” 
But Chris was also aware of the human difficulties in scaling 
the combinatorial complexities inherent in the traditional 
approach [9]: “It is..not possible to replace the actions of a 
trained designer by mechanically computed decisions.  Yet at 
the same time the individual designer's inventive capacity is too 
limited for him to solve design problems successfully entirely 
by himself.” 
This is the Lickliderian Human-Machine symbiosis problem 
discussed in Part 1. To solve this logjam, Chris initially 
proposed a set-theoretic pattern-language that is mathematical 
enough to engage the machine, while human enough to break 
out of the patterns when needed [9]: 
Caught in a net of language of our own invention, we 
overestimate the language's impartiality. Each concept, at 
the time of its invention no more than a concise way of 
grasping many issues, quickly becomes a precept.  We take 
the step from description to criterion too easily, so that what 
is at first a useful tool becomes a bigoted preoccupation.  
This framework has significant resemblance to the 
Axiomatic Design framework. Chris terms the hierarchical FR-
set as the set of misfits (M) and the linkages between the 
elements in M as the linkage set (L) which is akin to the Design 
Matrix (DM) in AD.  These two sets together constitute a linear 
graph G(M,L). He then posits that this graph can be 
transformed into the design form by creating what he calls the 
“Constructive Diagram” (CD) which is indeed a holistic 
visualization of the Design Matrix (DM) at various levels [9]:  
“We shall call a diagram constructive if and only if it is both at 
once - if and only  if  it  is  a  requirement  diagram  and  a  
form  diagram  at the same time.” 
Chris provides ample illustration of the Construction 
Diagram approach in [9]. And once the top down misfits & 
linkages graph G(M,L) as well as the Constructive Diagram 
(CD) is assembled, the designer may then synthesize the 
realization set (i.e., the DPs) in a top-down fashion. Here there 
is a key differences between the G(M,L) approach and AD; the 
G(M,L) approach does not recognize the zigzag mapping that 
occurs between the FRs and DPs at every stage of the 
decomposition. Thus the FRs have to be decomposed (top-
down) before the DPs may be assembled (bottom-up). This is 
of course unrealistic; one cannot decompose the FRs into the 
next level without first mapping it to the DPs at the same level. 
This is also the reason why the FR linkage set L is presumed to 
be known without considering the DPs. Chris did not develop 
the G(M,L) approach further; instead he moved on and 
proposed the Pattern Language (ÐP/PL) approach which 
defines relationships between the patterns in a ÐP Catalog [10]: 
The elements of this language are entities called 
patterns. Each pattern describes a problem which occurs 
over and over again in our environment, and then 
describes the core of the solution to that problem, in such 
a way that you can use this solution a million times over, 
without ever doing it the same way twice. 
Here the fundamental problem is in coming up with an 
appropriate language ÐP/PL that is sufficiently structured to 
aid in the bottom-up cataloging of the ÐPs, the iterative, zigzag, 
top-down/bottom-up composition & decomposition of the 
design. Also it has to be sufficiently flexible to help identify 
gaps and allow reaching beyond the current catalog of ÐPs 
where necessary. This is where integrating Chris’s G(M,L) 
framework [9], his later work on ÐP/PL [10] along with 
insights from AD may prove fruitful. Here, the hierarchical 
bipartite zigzag mapping between FRs↔DPs is key. Relations 
between ÐPs fall into the following categories:  
x Is-A: Pattern B is a subtype of Pattern A: A←B 
x Uses: Pattern X calls Pattern Y: Y()←X 
x Decomposition: A composed of B, C & D: A [B,C,D] 
x Alternatives: A & B are mutually replaceable:{A,B}  
In [2], Haﬁz et al. have used a bottom-up approach to 
meticulously put together a series of Construction Diagrams 
(CDs) that capture the relationships between the various 
CyberSecurity ÐPs. These are then composed to arrive at a 
holistic CD which serves as the master Pattern Language that 
finds an appropriate place for each of the 96 ÐPs and the 
hierarchical/transformational relations between them. This is 
indeed a Pattern “Language” as it affords the expression of 
intent and execution both at a high level of abstraction as well 
as its transformation down into the concretes.  
Fig. 2 converts the PL in [2] into a Design Matrix [DM]. The 
corresponding FRs & ÐPs are as shown in Fig. 1 along with the 
color-coding shown therein. The DM is sparse with very few 
off-diagonal terms. Those on the diagonal that tend to be 
batched together have been demarcated with a bold red 
boundary. The design naturally evolves from a high-level grey 
(top-left) to external-in-green, the periphery-in-blue and the 
core-in-red tones (bottom-right).  
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The few cells above the diagonal may be easily transformed 
to render the DM in a lower-triangular form to explicitly satisfy 
the axioms. Cells in pink are replaceable alternatives (where 
the FR, ÐP and the corresponding DM rows could be 
exchanged). Cells in purple allow feedback from lower-level 
design artifacts to those at the higher level, which 
asymptotically should fade across time. The DM does indeed 
provide all the functionality as that of the CDs. Also it 
completes the “unfinished symphony” that Chris Alexander 
started-off with in the context of the G(M,L) framework by 
correcting the stand-alone decomposition/composition of the 
FRs and ÐPs, and instead using the iterative, zigzag mapping 
between FRs↔DPs. Also, since the DM matrix can easily be 
transformed into an incidence matrix for input into a network 
graphing package (such as Mathematica or Gephi [11]), the 
various CDs in [2] (both holistic and partial) may be 
automatically graphed. Fig.2 shows an example of the partial 
graphing of the first 16 FRs. Also, when viewed as a dynamic 
network, one may study how the Pattern Language is evolving 
across time. The DM is the ideal instrument to bring about the 
proper Lickliderian Human-Machine symbiosis in the context 
of design towards scale, which indeed has relevance for Agile. 
The actual act of design in the context of a ÐP inspired PL 
involves a top-down traversal from the abstract to the concrete. 
If all of design were to be articulated via the PL, then there 
would be mostly “selection” and very little of “invention”. It 
is therefore to be expected that any new FRs (especially at the 
higher levels) would necessitate splicing in novel, problem-
specific FR↔DP mappings into the existing FR↔ÐP 
mappings. And as these newly created inventions make its way 
in the collection of similar designs, it may transition into a ÐP.  
5. /\/: System Integration (3rd-Leg) 
Once the PL has been assembled, it is important to use it as 
an aid and not as a crutch. Otherwise, as Chris indicated, the 
“useful tool becomes a bigoted preoccupation”.  
As mentioned earlier, unlike DP, the ÐP is not specific to a 
given problem. That being the case, how could one ensure that 
in the case of a specific design problem, the ÐPs being used in 
the decompositional/compositional phases do provide adequate 
coverage? How will the ÐP/PL approach assure top-down 
coverage and bottom-up compatibility? As Chris recognized in 
[9], the act of design is not merely in finding suitable sub-parts 
from a patterns cook-book. It instead is in grasping the whole, 
using composition of cook-book patterns where available, but 
filling the gaps with new and original one-of-a-kinds that may 
very well become patterns at a later date. Without such a 
holistic approach, the design would have holes and lack 
integrity. This is especially critical in the context of 
CyberSecurity as the adversary is constantly probing for 
security holes. Note that in Fig. 2 (color legend), many of the 
cells are marked “NK”—meaning “not known”.  These are 
potential security holes that have not even been formulated. 
Used in this sense, the PL may be of value in identifying 
regions of lacunae in the ÐP catalog.  Note that these are 
bottom-up approaches for the system integration of the ÐP-
system itself. 
Feedback and System Integration also occurs in the actual 
FR↔DP design. Thus, as noted before, DM cells in purple 
allow feedback from lower-level design artifacts to those at the 
higher level, which asymptotically should fade across time. 
And even though the hierarchical design tree is top-down 
acyclic, nothing stops us from traversing it in the opposite 
direction to test and prove that the lower nodes indeed does 
comply with the design intent set at the higher nodes.  These 
are the many ways in which one may attain System Integration. 
6. Cross-Domain Integrations 
There is a key assertion made by Haﬁz et al. regarding the 
lack of genericity in the PL [2]: “There is a pattern language 
for object-oriented design, and a pattern language for security, 
and another pattern language for performance.” 
It is true that when the PL is materialized as a set of CDs, it 
is indeed difficult to find commonalities. However, if the PL is 
captured as the DM and materialized as an incidence matrix of 
a network graph, the above ideal of PL genericity ought to be 
achievable. And as mentioned, this is where the AD/CT-ÐP 
mash-up may show unexpected positive results both at the 
tooling level as well as in seeding cross-domain integrations.  
For example, the immune system ÐPs that nature has 
selected across billions of years of evolution of life may have 
direct relevance for modern Cyber Systems. So likewise when 
considering ÐPs in the context of 3D-printing and nano-
technology.  As indicated in Part 1, Prof. Suh et al. adopted the 
V-Model to reverse-engineer the FR↔DP mappings of 
biological systems in a bottom-up/top-down sense [12]. When 
assembled across myriad such ensembles of related natural 
artifacts, these mappings then become FR↔ÐP mappings that 
have generic appeal. Nature after all preserves and reuses 
winning designs in the form of conserved genes that encode 
successful ÐPs.  
7. Cognitive-Biases, OODA, Cyber-Warfare & CASoS 
Having made the case for the use of ÐP/PL, consider now 
the dangers inherent in becoming too wedded to Design 
Patterns, especially in the context of Cyber-Security. While the 
scale and scope of the attacks discussed in §2 places it in the 
realm of Big Data, the defensive measures in terms of detection 
and year-long response-times have the cadence of wars fought 
in pre-historic times. This may be related to the fact that the 
theoretical foundations of cyberwar are not well founded. As 
Michael Hayden (former Director/CIA) has asserted [14]: 
“Rarely has something been so important and so talked about 
with less and less clarity and less apparent understanding.”  
Colonel John Boyd who wrote insightfully about 
asymmetric warfare does provide the appropriate framework 
for grasping the problem of CyberSecurity [15] (emphasis 
added): 
Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we 
should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our 
adversaries—or, better yet, get inside adversary’s 
observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle or 
loop. Why?  Such activity will make us appear ambiguous 
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(unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder 
among our adversaries—since our adversaries will be 
unable to generate mental images or pictures that agree 
with the menacing as well as faster transient rhythm or 
patterns they are competing against. 
Boyd’s OODA-loop framework integrates well with AD/CT 
along with the theory of knowledge hierarchy and dynamics 
(see Figs. 3a & 3b). The OODA-loop is initiated with the 
observational phase, or problem perception. This involves 
sensing signals (both internal and external) from the micro, 
meso and macro levels (see Part 1). Next is the orientation 
phase where the problem is abstracted to the right level in the 
knowledge hierarchy. This is followed by the decision or the 
design phase. As shown in Fig. 3a, the “what” and the “how” 
from AD/CT map well with Boyd’s OODA framework. Note 
however that AD/CT provides greater clarity by 
disambiguating the design process across the appropriate 
realms such as FRs, DPs, PVs, etc.  The action phase of the 
OODA loop devolves into myriad leaf-level nodes, including 
the final PV’s, the system integration, the testing, the training, 
etc. Each OODA cycle (both in whole and in parts) feeds the 
next cycle with the sole purpose of tightening the cognitive 
decision loop into “fast-transients”. The fundamental insight 
that Boyd put forth was in grasping the role of conflict inherent 
in nature, how it manifests in human knowledge, and how it 





Fig. 3. (a) Knowledge-Hierarchy & OODA; (b) OODA Loop; (c) Patterns of OODA Loop
 
Fig. 3c shows some of the patterns of conflict that result 
when two or more adversaries engage. The green-arcs represent 
friendly OODA-loops; the red-arcs represent enemy actions.  
The various CyberSecurity breaches listed in §2 above fall into 
the pattern shown in Fig. 3c(i).  Here the adversary is intimately 
knowledgeable about the green-teams OODA loop and is 
synchronized to execute within it, but at a faster cadence. Thus 
commenting on the OPM breach, S. Gallagher (IT editor at Ars-
Technica) noted that [16]: 
These attacks have occurred despite the $4.5 billion 
National Cybersecurity and Protection System (NCPS) 
program and its centerpiece capability, Einstein. 
But..Einstein..appears to be incapable of catching the sort 
of tactics that have become the modern baseline for state-
sponsored network espionage and criminal attacks. Once 
such attacks are executed, they tend to look like normal 
network traffic. 
Fig. 3c(ii) is the case of conceptual friendly-fire where the 
concrete-level decision-making is happening at a slower rate 
than the more abstract-layers; this is most likely on account of 
inadequate levels of automation at the lower levels. The 
converse of this pattern would be when the abstract layers are 
executing at too slow a rate to match the rapidly-evolving basal 
layers; this pattern was considered in Part 1.  Fig. 3c(iii) is an 
extreme case of friendly-fire where the organization is 
dysfunctional enough to host two antagonistic cultures that are 
at cross-purposes with each other. Fig. 3c(iv) is the case of the 
swarm-attack (e.g., DoS), where multiple enemy agents are 
loosely coordinating scant resources to engage a slower 
moving target across the overall attack surface. Thus 
commenting on the origins of the OPM breach, R. Barger, co-
founder of ThreatConnect stated that [6]: “We think it's likely a 
cohort of Chinese actors, a bunch of mini-groups that are 
handled by one main benefactor… [and] the group could get 
software tools and other resources from a common supplier.” 
 While patterns in Figs. 3c(i) & 3c(iv) are compelling in 
capturing the conflicts between nation-states, the friendly-fire 
patterns in Figs. 3c(ii) & 3c(iii) are equally noteworthy. This is 
because as a system scales, it is these two seminal patterns 
inherent in a poorly conceived system that fundamentally 
compromise the integrity of a system, resulting in an inviting 
attack-surface for adversaries. Note that these friendly-fire 
OODA-loops may exist within a given individual or institution. 
Thus habits of thought and action that form within an individual 
or an institution can calcify and thwart breaking out of an 
outdated decision-cycle loop that is dominant.  Humans are 
creatures of habit; and the tools we use (both individually as 
well as collectively), including tools such as ÐPs can trap us in.  
    Also, as Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman has shown 
[17], we are encumbered with cognitive biases that form 
patterns of faulty decision-making styles. Our evolutionary 
bias is towards fast-paced, low-stratum, routine thinking 
(System 1), while high-stratum, out-of-the-box, complex 
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thinking (System 2) requires intense focus and effort, and is 
therefore slow. Framing System 1 & 2 within the context of the 
knowledge-hierarchy dynamics and the proper symbiotic 
relationship between the human and the machine (as discussed 
in Part 1), it becomes increasingly clear that System-1 type 
thinking needs to be relegated more and more to the machine 
while humans move up the chain towards high-stratum, 
System-2 thinking. Mental confusion and paralysis of thought 
happens when Systems-1 and 2 are conflicted, as in Fig. 3c(iii). 
   From the perspective of CyberSecurity, these inherent 
biases can be tracked and exploited by adversaries both within 
and without. For example, phishing-attacks take advantage of 
our cognitive-biases such as Priming and Confirmation-Bias. 
Priming sets up conscious and sub-conscious trust-associations 
(such as the look and feel of a bank web-site) that may be 
exploited. This may be thwarted by presenting the general 
website with a custom icon that is individual and personal to 
the user during the course of a multi-factor authentication. The 
underlying principle here is that it is not just the user who needs 
to authenticate; the website also needs to repeatedly establish 
that it is authentic. Confirmation-Bias is more abstract and 
internal and alludes to the notion that “if all you have is a 
hammer, then everything looks like a nail”; for example, in 
CyberSecurity, it could be a socially engineered Trojan sent 
from a compromised but trusted friend. Patterns of security or 
the lack of it is thus ultimately a state of the mind; to address it 
in a fundamental sense requires it to be reduced to patterns 
discernable in human cognitive biases as shown in [17].     
   Wars of the future will be fought in the crucible of the 
individual human mind, but targeted at the mass population-
level. Consider the expert assessment of the OPM breach [18]: 
x The threat could include intruders already in the 
government whose security credentials were stealthily 
enhanced during the OPM intrusion, which may have 
lasted a year before it was detected last April. 
x It’s the digital equivalent of Pearl Harbor. Because people 
don’t see the carnage, they don’t recognize that this is the 
equivalent of an act of war. This is about espionage—Cold 
War tactics in the modern digital age. 
x Government is paralyzed. They don’t know what to do. 
x At a minimum, 24 million people have a counter-
intelligence problem. 
x The problems deepen further if the cyber-intruders start to 
combine that information with data from the social media 
of targets, which can deepen understanding of their habits, 
fears, travel plans and much more. It also heightens their 
vulnerability in travelling outside the U.S. 
The following quote from RUSI makes the stakes 
abundantly clear [19]: “The front line exists in the mind of each 
individual citizen.” 
This is where John Boyd’s writings indicates that he grasped 
the essence of the problem from the perspective of knowledge 
hierarchy and dynamics [20]: 
To make..timely decisions implies that we must be able 
to form mental concepts of observed reality, as we 
perceive it, and be able to change these concepts as 
reality itself appears to change....There are two ways in 
which we can develop and manipulate mental concepts to 
represent observed reality: we can start from a 
comprehensive whole and break it down to its particulars 
or we can start with the particulars and build towards a 
comprehensive whole. Saying it another way, but in a 
related sense, we can go from the general-to-specific or 
from the specific-to-general. A little reflection here 
reveals that deduction is related to proceeding from the 
general-to-specific while induction is related to 
proceeding from the specific-to-general. 
He then goes on to prescribe a strategic and deliberate top-
down destructive-deduction phase followed by a constructive-
induction phase to help continuously rebuild and reshape the 
knowledge architectures. This is similar to the deliberate 
mining and gap-closing of the reverse-salients as discussed in 
Part 1. And it has strategic implications in the modern world of 
asymmetric conflicts (whether internal or external). This is 
because establishing conceptually hard-to-reach, knowledge 
beachheads is the ultimate asymmetry.  
    In the context of cybersecurity, what it means is that while 
cybersecurity patterns aggregate current norms and best-
practices, attempts to overcome failures such as the OPM-
breach will demand breaking current patterns and stepping 
beyond to establish new patterns at various levels to help close 
the growing reverse-salients inherent in [7].   
Thus in the OPM case, FR23↔ÐP23 is weak: “Establish 
Authentication where client lacks direct trust relation.” To 
understand its weakness, consider the OPM case [6]: “Both the 
Anthem and OPM breaches used malicious software 
electronically signed as safe with a certificate stolen from 
DTOPTOOLZ Co, a Korean software company, the people 
close to the inquiry said.”  
This can be traced to ÐP23: Brokered Authentication, which 
is a weak ÐP [22]: “Any compromise of an authentication 
broker results in the integrity of the trust that is provided by the 
broker also being compromised.”  
Note that the above reverse salient was identified close to 10 
years ago, yet it remains open. Closing of these and other 
similar reverse salients would need a Boydian approach of 
breaking and reconstituting prevalent ÐPs. This is similar to the 
motto behind ÐP16: “White Hats Hack Thyselves”; except that 
the White Hats predominantly use heuristics while the Boydian 
approach frames it in the context of fast-transients to be 
obtained via purposeful knowledge dynamics. Such transients 
could include quantum cryptography at the technical level, 
mass-customized identity-resets with pseudonyms at the 
government-level, training in identifying and overcoming 
cognitive-biases at the human-level, etc.   
Modern socio-technical systems are massively Complex 
Adaptive System of Systems (CASoS) [21]. The internet is one 
such system that includes legitimate as well as illegitimate 
activities by its various stakeholders. Designing and evolving 
such systems will involve precipitating and evolving the 
Pattern Language in each of its constituent CAS-subsystems as 
well as the overall CASoS-wide Pattern Language (Fig. 4). On 
account of reductionist cognitive-biases prevalent in modern 
thinking, reverse-salients often lurk undetected in the 




















Fig. 4. Design of Complex Adaptive System of Systems (CASoS) 
 
As modern life becomes more and more dependent on such 
massively complex socio-technical systems, it is imperative 
that we bring order to the looming chaos.   
8. Conclusion 
Part 2 illustrated the AD/ÐP mashup in the domain of 
Cybersecurity. This involved the four-step N-model:  
x 1st Leg of /\/: Creating the Patterns Catalog (PC) & piecing 
together the Patterns Language (PL) along with the 
Construction Diagrams (CDs), all in a bottom-up fashion  
x 2nd Leg of /\/: Integrating PL with the Axiomatic 
Framework using the far more generic and machine-
readable Design Matrix (DM) and then showing how to 
use this in design by splicing in FR↔DP with FR↔ÐP.     
x 3rd Leg of /\/: System Integration at various levels 
including ÐP, PL, asymptotically vanishing feed-back 
loops as well as cross-level checks on design intent. 
x Cross-Domain Integrations: This step challenged the 
prevailing view that Pattern Languages are domain-
specific. Instead it was argued that the Design Matrix 
[DM] provides a generic, machine-readable repository for 
capturing in-domain as well as cross-domain PLs.  
Finally in section in §7, the case was made that Cyberwar is 
being waged at the fine-grain of the individual human mind as 
the war-front; that cognitive biases are fatal; that Boyd’s theory 
of OODA-loops and fast-transients integrates well with the 
earlier framework of knowledge-dynamics to help understand 
why it is important to make and deliberately go about probing 
and breaking prevalent ÐPs. Also, when placed in the CASoS 
framework, the case was made that cross-system interfaces are 
choice spots for probing such weaknesses.    
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